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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
HEATHER POOLE,    : 
  plaintiff,    : 
      : 
 v.     : Civil no. 3:18cv00859(AVC) 
      : 
TUMBLR, INC.,    : 
  defendant.    : 
 
RULING ON THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
 This is an action for damage s in which the plaintiff, 
Heather Poole, alleges that the defendant, Tumblr, Inc., 
unlawfully displayed photographs of Poole and failed to remove 
them from their website.  Poole brings her claims pursuant to 
common law tenets concerning invasion of privacy and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress.1  Tumblr has filed the within 
motion to dismiss arguing that the complaint fails to state a 
claim.  The issue to be determined is whether Tumblr is entitled 
to immunity under section 230(c)(1) of the Communications 
Decency Act (hereinafter “CDA”).  For the reasons that follow, 
the motion is granted. 
FACTS 
 The complaint states the following facts. 
 Poole is a resident of Bristol, Connecticut. 
                                                            
1 The June 14, 2018 amended complaint also seeks relief pursuant to copyright 
law and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § § 512, 1201-1205.  
However, on September 9, 2018, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to 
withdraw those claims. 





 Tumblr, Inc. “operates the internet website URL 
www.tumblr.com which is available in the United States and 
throughout the world.  Tumblr allows its subscribers to post 
images, music and videos on Tumblr servers. Tumblr copies and 
stores such materials, and displays and distributes them to the 
public.” 
 In May 2017, Poole “began dating Tomak Paluch of Bristol 
CT. The parties were involved in an intimate relationship.”  The 
complaint alleges that on August 12, 2017 and on other dates, 
“the parties exchanged intimate naked photographs of each 
other.” 
 On “September 5, 2017, the parties separated, and the 
plaintiff deleted any photographs she had of Mr. Paluch and 
blocked his telephone number, Facebook and all other means of 
communications.” 
 “On September 13, 2017[,] Mr. Paluch posted on Facebook a 
public status about [Poole] which was taken down after a 
complaint made to Facebook. Thereafter Mr. Paluch continued to 
harass [Poole].” 
 “On January 5, 2018[,] Mr. Paluch posted five (5) nude 
photos of [Poole] to myex.com. . . . These photos were also 
posted on Facebook and after the plaintiff made a complaint to 
the local police department, the photos were removed.” 





 “On January 6, 2018[,] although myex.com removed the photos 
they were then uploaded to Tumblr using the plaintiff’s name, 
links to Facebook and Linkedin, and added other personal 
information. Other users re-blogged her photos to other sites 
with links to her social media accounts. Various messages were 
sent to the plaintiff either threatening her or alerting her to 
the nude photos on Tumblr.” 
 From January 7, 2018 to January 15, 2018, twenty three 
“posts reported to Tumblr using their ‘report’ link.”  
 “Notwithstanding the fact that users often report the 
plaintiff’s photos daily after Tumblr removes them, Tumblr 
continues to post the same. On numerous and diverse dates, the 
plaintiff has requested that Tumblr take down her unauthorized 
intimate photographs but such photographs, even though [sic] the 
date of [the]complaint, continue to appear on Tumblr.” 
 The complaint states that “[t]he foregoing acts of 
contributory infringement by Tumblr have been willful, 
intentional and purposeful, in disregard of and with 
indifference to the rights of plaintiff.”   
STANDARD 
 A court must grant a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if a plaintiff fails to 
establish a claim upon which relief may be granted.  Such a 
motion “asses(es) the legal feasibility of the complaint, [it 





does] not . . . assay the weight of the evidence which might be 
offered in support thereof.”  Ryder Energy Distribution Corp. v. 
Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 
1984).  When ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept 
the facts alleged in the complaint as true, and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”  Broder v. 
Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 196 (2d Cir. 2005).  In 
order to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must allege 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on 
its face.”  Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007).  The complaint must allege more than “[t]hreadbare 
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009).  The court may consider only those “facts stated on the 
face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or 
incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of 
which judicial notice may be taken.”  Allen v. WestPoint-
Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1991). 
DISCUSSION 
 Tumblr argues that it is entitled to immunity from 
liability with respect to Poole’s invasion of privacy claim.  
Specifically, Tumblr argues that section 230 of the CDA, 47 
U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), 230(e)(3), provides Tumblr with such 
immunity.  According to Tumblr, “Poole has brought this 





copyright and invasion of privacy action against the wrong 
defendant. Accepting all of the allegations in her Complaint as 
true, Plaintiff may have a legitimate grievance against an ex-
boyfriend and third parties who published . . . photographs of 
her . . . . But whatever those claims may be, Plaintiff does 
not, and cannot, allege any viable claims against Tumblr.” 
 Poole argues in opposition that “Tumblr misunderstands the 
gravamen of [her] complaint; the complaint is not that Tumblr 
published her nude photographs which were sent from a third 
party: her complaint is that Tumblr continued to do so after 
receiving notice from [Poole] at least 7 times to take down her 
photographs.”  According to Poole, Congress enacted the 
Communications Decency Act in order “to protect Internet Service 
Providers (ISP) from litigation when they act as a ‘Good 
Samaritan’ blocking or editing offensive postings.”  Tumblr’s 
alleged conduct in this case does not, according to Poole, fall 
within that purpose.  Poole also notes that section 230’s 
immunity “is not absolute” and requires a showing of good faith.  
Poole states that in this case there is an issue as to “whether 
or not the good faith issue was involved by the ISP’s conduct in 
ignoring the electronic fingerprint of [Poole’s] photographs.” 
 Tumblr replies that Poole’s attempt to read a good faith 
requirement into section 230 is not legally supported and not 
factually pled.  Specifically, Tumblr argues that “[f]ederal 





courts have specifically and consistently rejected the argument 
that § 230(c)(1)’s immunity is conditioned on good faith or 
preemptive blocking of offensive conduct.”  Tumblr notes that 
the purpose of the Common Decency Act is to provide broad 
immunity to any claim that would make providers liable for 
third-party user information and prevents claims that put a 
provider, like Tumblr, in a “publisher’s role.”  Tumblr states 
that section 230(c)(1) does not require that it “preemptively 
block publication” of Poole’s photographs and notes that 
Congress recognized “speech interests” when enacting these broad 
provisions for service provider immunity.  According to Tumblr, 
none of the cases that Poole cites provide authority to the 
contrary.  Even if there is a good faith requirement in section 
230(c)(1), Tumblr notes that Poole has failed to plead facts 
that Tumblr had the technology to identify Poole’s “electronic 
fingerprint” but “chose not to deploy it.”  Finally, Tumblr 
reiterates that it meets the 230(c)(1) requirements for immunity 
because it is undisputed that it is a provider of an interactive 
computer service, the information at issue was provided by a 
third party user and the claim at issue seeks to treat Tumblr as 
a publisher.  Therefore, Tumblr states that its immunity is 
“evident from the face of the complaint.”  
 Section 230 provides that “[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher 





or speaker of any information provided by another information 
content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). “Preemption is 
express: ‘No cause of action may be brought and no liability may 
be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent 
with this section.’” Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 
F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir 2015) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3)).  “The 
statute defines ‘interactive computer service’ expansively, to 
include ‘any information service, system, or access software 
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple 
users to a computer server.’”  Id. at 27-28 (quoting § 
230(f)(2)). The second circuit has recognized that “this wording 
has been construed broadly to effectuate the statute's speech-
protective purpose . . . .”  Id. at 28.  Specifically, the court 
recognized that 
 Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits 
 pose to freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning 
 Internet medium.... Section 230 was enacted, in part, to 
 maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, 
 accordingly, to keep government interference in the medium 
 to a minimum.... None of this means, of course, that the 
 original culpable party who posts defamatory messages would 
 escape accountability.... Congress made a policy choice, 
 however, not to deter harmful online speech through the 
 separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that 
 serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially 
 injurious messages. 
 
Id. (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 
(4th Cir. 1997)). As a result, “a plaintiff defamed on the 
internet can sue the original speaker, but typically ‘cannot sue 





the messenger.’”  Id. (quoting Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil 
Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 672 
(7th Cir. 2008)). 
 “In applying the statute, courts have ‘broken [it] down 
into three component parts,’ finding that ‘[i]t shields conduct 
if the defendant (1) ‘is a provider or user of an interactive 
computer service, (2) the claim is based on information provided 
by another information content provider and (3) the claim would 
treat [the defendant] as the publisher or speaker of that 
information.’’” Federal Trade Commission v. LeadClick Media, 
LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Jane Doe No. 1 v. 
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Universal Commc'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 
(1st Cir. 2007))).  “Although “[p]reemption under the 
Communications Decency Act is an affirmative defense, ... it can 
still support a motion to dismiss if the statute's barrier to 
suit is evident from the face of the complaint.”  Ricci v. 
Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir 2015) 
(quoting Klayman v. Zukerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 
2014) (citing McKenna v. Wright,386 F.3d 432, 436 (2d 
Cir.2004))). 
 There is no dispute that Tumblr has satisfied the three 
statutory requirements for immunity pursuant to section 
230(c)(1).  Specifically, Tumblr “is a provider or user of an 





interactive computer service,” the claim here involves 
information provided by a third party and Poole’s claims for 
invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional distress “treat 
[Tumblr] as the publisher or speaker of that information.”  
Federal Trade Commission v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 
173 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). Therefore, the only issue to be determined is whether 
section 230 contains a good faith requirement and, as a result, 
an issue of fact exists with respect to Tumblr’s alleged 
conduct. 
 In Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 2011WL5079526 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 
2011), aff'd, 765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014), the court addressed 
the issue of whether section 230(c)(1) contains a good faith or 
intent requirement.  Id. at *7.  The court held that the fact 
“[t]hat § 230(c)(2)2 expressly provides for a good faith element” 
and such requirement is “omitted from § 230(c)(1) indicates that 
Congress intended not to import a subjective intent/good faith 
limitation into § 230(c)(1).”   Id. at *7.  The Levitt court 
                                                            
2 Section 230(c)(2) provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
 No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held 
 liable on account of— 
 (A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or 
 availability of material that the provider or user considers to be 
 obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or 
 otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is 
 constitutionally protected; or 
 (B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content 
 providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material 
 described in paragraph (1). 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (emphasis added). 





recognized that “‘[w]here Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another ..., it is 
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and 
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’”  Id. 
(quoting Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 
(1993)).  Therefore, the court concluded that “the text of the 
two subsections of § 230(c) indicates that (c)(1)'s immunity 
applies regardless of whether the publisher acts in good faith.”  
Levitt at *7. 
 In Zeran v. AOL, 129 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 1997), the 
fourth circuit held that section 230(c)(1) provided immunity to 
the defendant, AOL, where it took down third parties’ allegedly 
defamatory statements, but it did not prevent the statements 
from being republished.  The court recognized that “lawsuits 
seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a 
publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding 
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are 
barred.”  Id. at 330; see Federal Trade Commission v. LeadClick 
Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016).  Further, in 
Universal Commc’n Sys, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413 (1st 
Cir. 2007), the first circuit held that “[i]t is, by now, well 
established that notice of the unlawful nature of the 
information provided is not enough to make it the service 
provider’s own speech.”  Id. at 420.  The court confirmed that 





other courts have recognized “that Section 230 immunity applies 
even after notice of the potentially unlawful nature of the 
third-party content.”  Id. 
 Poole has failed to provide authority for the proposition 
that section 230(c)(1) includes a requirement of good faith. The 
facts of this case amount to state law claims “seeking to hold a 
service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s 
traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to 
publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content . . . .”  Zeran v. 
AOL, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see Federal Trade 
Commission v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 
2016). As the second circuit has recognized, by enacting section 
230(c)(1) “Congress made a policy choice . . . not to deter 
harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing 
tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for 
other parties' potentially injurious messages.”  Ricci v. 
Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir 2015) 
(quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th 
Cir. 1997)). Although immunity pursuant to section 230(c)(1) is 
an affirmative defense, in this case “the statute's barrier to 
suit is evident from the face of the complaint.”  Ricci v. 
Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 28 (2d Cir 2015).3   As 
                                                            
3 As previously stated, Tumblr “is a provider or user of an interactive 
computer service,” the claim here involves information provided by a third 
party and Poole’s claims for invasion of privacy and infliction of emotional 





the facts of this case satisfy the requirements for immunity 
under section 230(c)(1), Tumblr’s motion to dismiss is granted.  
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Tumblr’s motion to dismiss 
(document no. 12) is granted. 
 So ordered this 4th day of March, 2019, at Hartford, 
Connecticut. 
         /s/     
       Alfred V. Covello 
       United States District Judge 
                                                            
distress “treat [Tumblr] as the publisher or speaker of that information.”  
Federal Trade Commission v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 
2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The allegations in 
the complaint support this conclusion and the plaintiff has not provided 
arguments to the contrary. 
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